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Abstract
Background: The recent H1N1 influenza A pandemic was marked by multiple reports of illness and hospitalization in
children, suggesting that children may have played a major role in the propagation of the virus. A comprehensive detailed
analysis of the attack rates among children as compared with their contacts in various settings is of great importance for
understanding their unique role in influenza pandemics.
Methodology/Principal Findings: We searched MEDLINE (PubMed) and Embase for published studies reporting outbreak
investigations with direct measurements of attack rates of the 2009 pandemic H1N1 influenza A among children, and
quantified how these compare with those of their contacts. We identified 50 articles suitable for review, which reported
school, household, travel and social events. The selected reports and our meta-analysis indicated that children had
significantly higher attack rates as compared to adults, and that this phenomenon was observed for both virologically
confirmed and clinical cases, in various settings and locations around the world. The review also provided insight into some
characteristics of transmission between children and their contacts in the various settings.
Conclusion/Significance: The consistently higher attack rates of the 2009 pandemic H1N1 influenza A among children, as
compared to adults, as well as the magnitude of the difference is important for understanding the contribution of children
to disease burden, for implementation of mitigation strategies directed towards children, as well as more precise
mathematical modeling and simulation of future influenza pandemics.
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Introduction
The 2009 pandemic H1N1 influenza A affected individuals in
more than 208 countries, territories and communities worldwide
and caused at least 13,554 deaths [1]. In comparison to previous
pandemics, novel technological methods were available for
diagnosis, analysis, medications and communication, providing
unique opportunity for both clinical and epidemiological analysis.
In this recent pandemic, more cases were reported in children and
young adults than in older adults [2], and more hospitalizations
occurred among children under 5 years of age [3]. These
observations suggest that children have been an important driving
force in pandemic propagation. However, many observations
relied on population surveys and reports, which may over- or
under-represent various age groups. A quantitative analysis of
pandemic influenza attack rates in the pediatric population with
comparison to their contacts is vital for understanding the role of
children in the propagation of the virus and their burden of
disease. Such understanding is of paramount importance for
establishing effective planning efforts and mitigation strategies,
particularly vaccination policies and social distancing efforts. A
quantitative analysis based on a detailed review of attacks in
various settings is also important for accurate simulation modeling
and impact assessment. The objective of this study was to analyze
the attack rates of the 2009 pandemic H1N1 influenza A virus in
children as compared to other individuals in various settings, by
performing a systematic review and meta-analysis of outbreak
investigations from diverse geographic locations.
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Methods
Data Source and Search Strategy
We performed a literature search of published journal articles
and reports of the 2009 pandemic H1N1 influenza A outbreaks. A
health sciences librarian performed a database search using
MEDLINE (PubMed) and Embase. The following search terms
were used to identify journal articles: 2009 AND H1N1 AND
(outbreak* OR transmission OR epidemiology) AND (child* OR
school* OR adolescen*). The search retrieved journal articles
included in PubMed from the first reported 2009 pandemic H1N1
influenza A outbreak [4] in March 2009 through the final day of
the database search. For Embase, the search included journal
articles included starting in 2009 through the final day of database
search. The final search date was May 8, 2012. The studies
identified with the above search strategy were screened first
according to titles and abstracts, and then by review of full-text
articles. Two reviewers selected the studies independently, using
predetermined inclusion and exclusion criteria. Differences in
opinion were resolved through consensus.
Inclusion Criteria
Studies were included in this review if they presented original
attack rates from specific outbreaks of the 2009 pandemic H1N1
influenza A and included children and/or adolescents in the
reports.
Exclusion Criteria
Studies of the 2009 pandemic H1N1 influenza A were excluded
if they described outbreaks that did not include children and/or
adolescents, if the outbreaks occurred in special populations (such
as oncology, immune deficiency or chronic debilitating condi-
tions), or if they consisted of population studies. Studies were also
excluded if they lacked data allowing determination of attack rates,
or determination that the outbreaks occurred due to the 2009
pandemic H1N1 influenza A (such as: none of the study subjects
were laboratory tested for the pandemic strain, or lack of
description of the methodology used for determination that the
pandemic strain was circulating among the outbreak subjects).
Studies using mathematical modeling for calculation of attack rates
without providing raw or original data used in model derivation
were additionally excluded.
Extraction of Data
Data were obtained directly from the reports. When not
explicitly stated, data were derived from graphs, tables, or charts
included in the reports or data supplements. The data collected
included the following: report location (country, state, city), report
dates, authors and attack rates.
Determination of Influenza Cases
Since individuals infected with influenza may manifest non-
specific symptoms or lack symptoms entirely, their identification
may be difficult without laboratory confirmation. For this study,
both virologically confirmed cases as well as clinically diagnosed
cases (following laboratory determination that the pandemic strain
was circulating among the outbreak subjects) were extracted and
evaluated.
Determination of Attack Rates
Attack rate (AR) refers to the cumulative incidence of infection or
disease in a group of people observed over time during an
outbreak or an epidemic [5]. It is calculated by dividing the
number of exposed individuals who developed disease by the total
number of individuals at risk [5]. Exposed individuals are those
individuals who are present in the same setting as the infecting
individual. In the articles selected for review, the specific settings
consisted of classrooms, schools, homes and buildings among
others. ARs were measured from the beginning (the first day of
illness of the index case) to the end (the first day of illness of the last
person to become ill) of an outbreak.
For household studies, secondary attack rate (SAR) was evaluated.
SAR is a measure of the spread of disease in households. It is
calculated by dividing the number of individuals in affected
households who developed disease after exposure to a primary
household case by the total number of household contacts of the
primary cases who are at risk. SAR is calculated for a specified
time period defined by the individual studies.
ARs and SARs based on clinically and virologically confirmed
cases were extracted from the selected studies. ARs and SARs
were calculated from articles’ tables and graphs when available
and not reported within the article narrative.
Attack Rate Meta-analysis
To quantify the differences in ARs and SARs among children
and adults, data from studies reporting their ARs and SARs in
similar settings were extracted. Both Laboratory confirmed and
clinical ARs and SARs were used for calculation. To quantify the
differences in laboratory confirmed cases, we included studies in
which at least 85% of the individuals diagnosed with influenza had
a virologically confirmed diagnosis by reverse transcription
polymerase chain reaction (RT-PCR). For each study, we
calculated the relative risk, 95% confidence interval and the p-
value. We accepted the cut-off age used by each study to
differentiate between children and adults.
Statistical Analysis
Means, relative risk and 95% Confidence Intervals (CI) were
calculated to compare ARs and SARs between children and adults
from different studies. These were calculated for each study found
appropriate for the calculation. A combined mean, relative risk
and 95% confidence interval was calculated for aggregates of
several studies sharing a comparable environment, such as school
(AR) or household (SAR). Statistical significance was calculated
using Chi Square analysis or Fisher Exact test. P value of ,0.05
was considered statistically significant. SPSS 15.0 software for PC
was used for statistical analysis.
Risk of Bias
Since studies and reports were based on field investigations with
the potential for heterogeneity with respect to the number of
individuals assessed, the extent to which confirmatory laboratory
tests were used, and clinical data collected, we assumed that risk of
bias (such as recall, diagnosis, reporting, etc.) existed. We thus
collected data and presented attack rates based on both clinical
symptoms as well as laboratory testing.
Results
Study Selection
The studies identified through the initial searches of MEDLINE
(PubMed) and Embase were merged into a single RefWorks
database. After removal of duplicate articles, 1797 articles were
screened. Screening was initially done according to titles and
abstracts and subsequently by further review of selected full-text
articles, using predetermined inclusion and exclusion criteria. A
total of 47 articles were ultimately selected. Three additional
Pandemic H1N1 Influenza A in Children and Contacts
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reports [6–8] were found through manual review of the reference
list of the selected reports [9–11]. Figure 1 presents a flow chart of
the selection process. The selected reports included outbreak
analyses from the following countries: Australia [10,12–14],
Canada [15–18], Chile [19], China [20–22], Finland [23], France
[24–27], Germany [28,29],Hong Kong [30,31], India [32], Japan
[33–35], Kenya [36], Republic of Korea [37], Netherlands [7],
New Zealand [38], Taiwan [39], United Kingdom (UK) [6,40–
45], and the United States (USA) [8,9,11,38,46–55]. Four reports
provided analysis related to one outbreak in the USA [8,9,11,51].
Table 1 outlines the reports included in this study.
School Associated Attack Rates
School outbreaks provide useful insight into the transmission of
the 2009 pandemic H1N1 influenza A virus among children and
their contacts. We identified sixteen studies reporting 2009
pandemic H1N1 influenza A outbreaks in nineteen schools (see
Table 2) [8,16,20,22,24,25,31,32,40–43,45,50–52]. These out-
breaks occurred at day schools, at schools that had both day and
boarding students and in one school that only boarded students
(Table 2). Most were primary and/or secondary schools. Only one
outbreak was reported in a nursery school (Table 2).
ARs were calculated based on the number of symptomatic
individuals (also known as clinical ARs) [16,45,51,52], based on
laboratory confirmation (virologically confirmed ARs)
[22,31,41,50] or both [16,20,24,25,32,40,43] (Table 2). Virolog-
ical confirmation was usually obtained using real-time reverse
transcription-polymerase chain reaction (RT-PCR). Occasionally,
RT-PCR was complemented with the use of serology for the 2009
pandemic H1N1 Influenza A [16,22,32] or viral culture [16].
Virological testing was used for either all or a portion of
symptomatic individuals in those studies utilizing laboratory
confirmation (Table 2). One study, from Toulouse, France, tested
all students and staff of an affected class for the 2009 H1N1
pandemic influenza A virus, irrespective of presence or absence of
symptoms [24]. Two studies, from China and India tested all or
most of their school student population [56].
Attack Rates Among Entire School Student Population
Attack rates for the entire school student population were
reported for sixteen schools [8,16,20,22,25,31,32,40,41,43,45,50–
52]. The virologically confirmed student ARs in schools ranged
from 0.3% to 49% (Table 2) and student clinical ARs ranged
between 1% and 80.4% (Table 2).
Five studies reported ARs among boarding students
[16,22,32,43,45], reporting higher ARs among boarders as
compared to day students. These differences reached statistical
significance in three schools [22,32,45] (Table 2).
Attack Rates Among School Working Staff
ARs among school working staff were available for seven
schools [8,31,32,40,41,43,52]. Both virologically confirmed ARs
and clinical attack ARs were substantially lower among school
working staff as compared with students (Table 2).
Distribution Patterns of Student Attack Rates within
Schools
Attack rates in different grades. Grade-specific ARs were
described in seven schools (outbreak schools 1,2,8,9, 13, 16 and 18)
[25,31,40,41,43,52] (Table 2), demonstrating substantial variabil-
ity. In some schools infected children were dispersed among all
grades (outbreak schools 1, 8, 9, and 13) [25,41,43]; in several
schools, one grade was more affected than the other grades
(outbreak school 1, 2,8, 16 and 18) [25,31,40,41,52]. In one of
these schools (outbreak school 2), the difference between the AR of
the most affected grade and the other grades was particularly large
(15% vs. 0–1%) [40]. Within that school [40], the various grades
were distributed among different buildings and floors, with the
most affected grade located predominantly on one floor of a small
building. This architectural layout potentially provided a trans-
mission barrier between the affected grade and the other grades.
Although several of the grades, including the most affected grade,
had an out-of-classroom student mixing or congregation during
lunch period, this mixing period did not appear to result in
substantial spread of the virus from the infected grade students to
students of other grades.
Attack rates in different classes of affected
grades. Class-specific ARs were calculated for six schools
(outbreak schools 2,5, 7, 8, 11, 12) [20,24,25,40,42]. In all these
schools, one class was more affected than other classes in the same
grade. School 12 reported an outbreak contained to a 6th grade
classroom of 30 students with a clinical attack rate of 60% and
laboratory-confirmed AR of 50% [24]. In outbreak schools 5 and
6 [42], the ARs of the most affected classes were 7% and 17%,
while other classes had an attack rate of 0% or 1% [42].
Differences in ARs among classes appeared to be associated
with the layout of some schools. In outbreak school 2 [40] the four
most affected classes of the affected 7th grade were located on the
same floor, having attack rates of 12% to 24% with a mean AR of
17.25%, while a fifth class located on a different floor in the same
building had a lowere AR of 8% [40]. In outbreak school 11, in
which multiple classes and multiple grades were affected, the most
affected classes were located in the same building [20].
Students activities were associated with AR differences of one
school. In outbreak school 8, the most affected class (with a clinical
AR of 37% compared to 26% in the rest of the grade) had
travelled, shortly before the start of the outbreak, to another
country which had a proven human-to-human transmission of the
2009 pandemic H1N1 influenza A virus [25].
The relationship between class ARs and the index cases were
reported for outbreak schools 5,6, and 8; in these schools the index
cases belonged to the classes with the highest attack rate [25,42].
Attack rate in different school divisions. One report (of
outbreak school 4) provided AR by school division (lower, middle
and upper), demonstrating the highest AR in the middle school
[50].
Attack rate in boarding school houses/dormitories. ARs
for students in different school boarding houses or dormitories
were reported in three studies (outbreak schools 13, 17 and 19)
[22,43,45], demonstrating a wide range. The ARs ranged from
1.8% to 18.9% (clinical) in one study [43], from 22.8% to 73.1%
in another (clinical) [45] and from 8.1% to 78.95% in a third study
(laboratory confirmed) [22].
Household Secondary Attack Rates
Households represent relatively confined environments where
social distancing strategies may be difficult to implement especially
in the presence of children. Household SARs, reported by various
studies, were calculated by using a time period defined by the
individual investigators. These time periods generally ranged from
seven to fourteen days, however, longer time of three to four weeks
was permitted in one study [17]. The studies varied with respect to
the number of households evaluated by each (Table 3), (ranging
from 4 [36] to 595 households [14] per study). In most studies the
index cases were of various ages (Table 3) and had virologically
confirmed pandemic H1N1 influenza A (Table 3). The studies
differed with regard to the diagnostic approach applied to
Pandemic H1N1 Influenza A in Children and Contacts
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Figure 1. Flow chart for study selection.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0050228.g001
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Table 1. 2009 Pandemic H1N1 Influenza A outbreak reports included in the systematic review.
Report No. Authors (Publication year) Outbreaks Location Type of report Outbreaks Dates Ref
1 Health Protection Agency West Midlands H1N1v
Investigation Team (2009)
West Midlands, UK School outbreak 5/2–5/29, 2009 [41]
2* a. Frieden, R. (2009), New York City, USA School outbreak 4/18–5/1, 2009 [8]
b. Lessler, J. et al. (2009) School outbreak [51]
c. France, A. M. et al. (2010) Household outbreaks [9]
d. Jackson, M.L. et al. (2011) Household outbreaks [11]
3 Center for Disease Control and Prevention
(2009)
Hawaii, USA School outbreak 5/1–5/17, 2009 [50]
4 Kar-Purkayastha, I. et al. (2009) UK School outbreaks Spring, 2009 [42]
5 Guinard, A. et al. (2009) Toulouse, France School outbreak June, 2009 [24]
6 Smith, A. et al. (2009) UK School outbreak 5/1–6/2, 2009 [43]
7 Cutler, J, E. et al. (2009) Nova Scotia, Canada School outbreak 4/9–4/30, 2009 [16]
8 Calatayud, L. et al. (2010) London, UK School outbreak 4/17–5/14, 2009 [40]
9 Carrillo-Santisteve, P. et al. (2010) Paris, France School outbreaks 6/17–6/27, 2009 [25]
10 Gurav, Y.K. et al. (2010) Maharashtra, India School outbreak July–August, 2009 [32]
11 Huai Y. et al. (2010) Guandong Province, China School outbreak June, 2009 [20]
12 Leung Y.H. et al. (2010) Hong Kong School outbreak June, 2009 [31]
Household outbreaks
13 Li T. et al (2011) Guangzhou, China School outbreak Aug–Oct, 2009 [22]
14 Marchbanks, T.L. et al. (2011) Pennsylvania, USA School outbreak May–June, 2009 [52]
Household outbreaks
15 Arinaminpathy, N. et ql. (2012) Unitd Kingdom School outbreak July, 2009 [45]
16 Witkop, C. T. et al. (2010) Colorado, USA Air Force Academy outbreak 6/25–7/24,2009 [49]
17 Center for Disease Control and Prevention
(2009)
Kenya Household outbreaks June–July, 2009 [36]
18 Odaira, F. et al (2009) Kobe, Japan Household outbreaks May–June, 2009 [34]
19 Crum-Cianflone, N. F. et al. (2009) San Diego, USA Outbreaks in Military
Beneficiaries
April–May, 2009 [47]
20 Cauchemez, S. et al. (2009) Six States, USA Household outbreaks 4/29–5/28.2009 [46]
21 Ghani, A. et al. (2009) UK Household outbreaks 4/27–6/10/2009 [6]
22 Komiya, N. et al. (2010) Osaka, Japan Household outbreaks May, 2009 [33]
23 Suess, T. et al. (2010) Germany Household outbreaks April–August, 2009 [28]
24 Sikora, C. et al. (2010) Edmonton, Canada Household outbreaks 4/30–6/9, 2009 [15]
25 Morgan, O. W. et al (2010) Texas, USA Household outbreaks April–May, 2009 [48]
26 Cowling, B. J. et al. (2010) Hong Kong Household outbreaks July–August, 2009 [30]
27 Papenburg J. et al. (2010) Quebec City, Canada Household outbreaks May–July, 2009 [17]
28 Goldstein E. al. (2010) Milwaukee, USA Household outbreaks April – June 2009 [53]
29 Looker C. et al. (2010) Victoria, Australia Household outbreaks May–August 2009 [13]
30 Chilean Task Force for Pandemic Influenza
A (H1N1) (2010)
Los Lagos, Chile Household outbreaks May–June, 2009 [19]
31 Lee, D.H. et al. (2010) Seoul, Republic of Korea Household outbreaks August–Nov, 2009 [37]
32 Van Boven, M. et al. (2010) Netherlands Household outbreaks April–June, 2009 [7]
33 Loustalot, F. et al. (2011) Texas, USA Household outbreaks April–May, 2009 [55]
34 Van Gemert C., et al. (2011) Victoria, Australia Household outbreaks May–June, 2009 [10]
35 Carcione, D. et al. (2011) Western Australia, Australia Household outbreaks May–Aug., 2009 [14]
36 Savage R. et al (2011) Ontario, Canada Household outbreaks April–June, 2009 [18]
37 Chang, L.Y. et al. (2011) Taiwan Household outbreaks Aug.–Nov., 2009 [39]
38 Pebody, R.G. et al. (2011) United Kingdom Household outbreaks April–July, 2009 [44]
39 Hirotsu, N. et al. (2012) Kawasaki city, Japan Household outbreaks July, 2009– April, 2010 [35]
40 Peltola, V. et al. (2012) Southwest Finland, Finland Household outbreaks Oct.–Nov., 2009 [23]
41 Ward, K.A. et al. (2010) Pacific Ocean, Australia Cruise Ship May, 2009 [12]
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household contacts, consisting either of virological or clinical
diagnosis (Table 3). The most prevalent method for virological
confirmation was RT PCR, which was used mostly in individuals
who had signs or symptoms of influenza. Serology [11,17,39],
rapid diagnostic assays [35,47] viral culture [18] or Direct
fluorescent antibody [15] was used as well in few studies.
Secondary Attack Rates (SARs) for Entire Household
Studies
SARs for entire households studies ranged from 3.7% to 51%
(Table 3). Most studies reported a single SAR (clinical or
virologically confirmed), while several studies reported SARs
based on both virological confirmation and clinical diagnosis.
Clinical SARs were calculated based on influenza like illness (ILI),
acute respiratory symptoms (ARI) or both (Table 3). While many
studies used virological confirmation for individuals who had
symptoms, several studies used virological testing for all the
individuals included in the study [11,17,23,28,30,37,39].
SARs Among Different Age Groups within Households
Eighteen household studies reported specific differences in
SARs among different age groups (Table 4). Although the studies
varied with respect to the cut-off limits of each age group, ranging
from 12 to 20 years of age, overall, they demonstrated higher
SARs among younger individuals as compared with adults
(Table 4). Few studies provided a more detailed age-group
analysis, reporting SARs of four separate age groups
[10,11,14,18]; however, the high variability in the cut off ages
between these age groups and the low number of studies providing
such information did not allow us to perform further analysis or
draw conclusions.
Analysis of SARs based on the ages of primary cases and
household contacts revealed that secondary infections were most
likely when transmission occurred among children, and least likely
when transmission occurred among adults [39,44,48,53].
Several studies addressed specific family role in transmission,
showing that the risk of transmission rose with the increase in the
number of children in the household [13], that siblings tended to
have higher attack rates than parents [31,34], that young infants
tended to be infected from an older sibling or a parent in the
household [23], and that mothers contracted influenza more
frequently than fathers or other household adults [9].
Attack Rates in Other Settings
Transmission of the 2009 pandemic H1N1 influenza A virus
among children and their contacts was evaluated in additional
settings including transportation, travel, social events and summer
camps.
Transportation and Travel
Air, sea and surface travel are conducive to infectious agent
transmission. Transmission of the 2009 H1N1 influenza A was
reported to occur during flights [48,57,58], sea travel [12,47,59]
and prolonged road travel [26,57].
Road transportation. Many children utilize school-provided
transportation to attend school. Two different school bus rides,
lasting 50 or 60 minutes per day, each carrying a child confirmed
to have the 2009 pandemic H1N1 influenza A virus, resulted in
AR of 0% in each bus (based on clinical manifestations and
virological testing of children with influenza-like illness) [42]. In
contrast, a prolonged road travel by bus and train lasting 5 hours,
of a group of holiday campers consisting of 24 children and 5
adults who shared the same train wagon, resulted in an efficient
transmission of pandemic H1N1 influenza A [26]. The index case
was a symptomatic child whose nose was in close proximity to the
train wagon vent. The clinical AR was 91% among children and
60% among adults traveling with the index case [26]. The
particularly high attack rates in both adults and children, the
occurrence of illness of 96% of the individuals within 2 days of
travel and the index case position with respect to the vent
suggested that the outbreak was due to a single point exposure
with the possibility of airborne transmission [26].
A different outcome of a prolonged journey was seen among
members of a high school musical group from New Zealand that
toured California USA for one week during the time that human
transmission of the pandemic 2009 H1N1 influenza A was
detected in the USA [38]. The tour included travel within
California, a 12 hour flight to New Zealand (sitting in the same
airplane section) and a six hour bus ride in New Zealand. One
group member became symptomatic due to the 2009 pandemic
H1N1 influenza A, one hour after arrival in New Zealand. None
of the other 11 group members who developed respiratory
symptoms were positive for the virus by RT PCR, and only one of
them was moderately positive by serology [38]. This low rate of
transmission occurred despite a 6 hour bus ride that [38] the group
took after the index case became symptomatic [38].
Sea travel. An outbreak of the 2009 pandemic H1N1
influenza A among individuals traveling on a cruise ship,
demonstrated higher ARs in individuals ,12 years old as
compared with older individuals [12]. Specifically, virologically
confirmed attack rates were 18.3% and 2.5% for children ,12
years old and older individuals respectively [12].
Table 1. Cont.
Report No. Authors (Publication year) Outbreaks Location Type of report Outbreaks Dates Ref
42 Mardani, J. et al. (2011) California, USA Travel April–May, 2009 [38]
Aukland, New Zealand
43 Pestre, V. et al. (2012) France Travel August, 2009 [26]
44 Nougairede, A. et al. (2010) South Eastern, France Summer Camp April–Aug, 2009 [27]
45 Tsalik, E.L., et al. (2010) North Carolina, USA Summer Camp May–Aug, 2009 [54]
46 Hermes, J. et al. (2011) Germany Party May–June, 1009 [29]
47 Pang, X. et al (2011) Beijing, China Close contacts 5/16–9/15, 2011 [21]
*All reports analyze the outcomes related to the same outbreak.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0050228.t001
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Social Events
Social and extracurricular activities are important part of
children’s and adolescent’s lives. ARs for the 2009 pandemic
H1N1 influenza A virus were reported for several types of social
events involving children.
Parties. The laboratory-confirmed AR following a party
lasting six hours involving nine children was between 14% and
25% [42]. This AR range was calculated based on one definite
source of infection, consisting of a symptomatic virologically
confirmed case and the possibility of a second source for infection
(a prodromal case) [42]. In another party of 28 adolescents ages 15
to 19 years old, the laboratory confirmed AR was 26% [29].
Pandemic influenza in contacts was related to greater length of
talking with the source case, more hugs and kisses exchanges with
her and staying overnight at the house where the party took place
[29].
Choir gathering. Virus activity was evaluated for choir
members, consisting of 62 children and 107 adults, following a
gathering that lasted several hours each day for two days [42]. The
index case of the choir was a student aged 11–12 years old. The
laboratory-confirmed AR among children was 6.6% and among
adults 2.8%.
Summer camp. The laboratory-confirmed AR at a residen-
tial summer camp in South Eastern France, hosting 94 children,
were 22.3%, 25%, and 8.3% for children, counselors and technical
staff, respectively. Including additional clinical cases, ARs were
38%, 44% and 25% for children, counselors and technical staff,
respectively [27]. An outbreak in residential summer camps in
North Carolina, USA, found clinical attack rates of up to 15%
among campers [54].
Close Contacts
An investigation of ARs among close contacts was carried out in
Beijing, China [21]. Close contacts were defined as any individual
who was, at any time, within 2 meters of a given index case. These
included household members, relatives who were not part of the
households, roommates, friends, school or workplace contacts,
flight passengers and service personnel met in public places.
Laboratory confirmed ARs were significantly higher among close
contacts that were younger than 20 years old as compared with
older individuals. The attack rates among close contacts were also
higher when the index cases were younger than 20 years old [21].
Assessment of Age-specific Attack Rates
Data from 20 studies reporting age group-specific ARs or SARs
were determined to be suitable for meta-analysis. Data from eight
studies were used for school outbreak AR analysis (Figure 2) and
data from 13 studies were used for household SAR analysis
(Figure 3). To assess ARs among children and adults in school
outbreaks, we compared ARs between students and staff. For
household studies we used the age cut off reported by each study to
compare SARs between children and adults (between 12 and 20
years of age) (Table 4). The relative risk, 95% confidence interval
and p value were calculated first for each of the studies. We then
calculated the overall values for the school studies as well as the
household studies. Laboratory confirmed or clinical ARs and
SARs, were analyzed separately. We used only those household
studies in which the index cases had virologically confirmed 2009
pandemic H1N1 influenza A. For those studies that reported
clinical SAR based on both ILI and ARI, we used ILI-based SAR.
The overall AR relative risks of students versus staff in school
outbreaks were 19.49 (95% CI 9.71–39.11) and 5.76 (95% CI
4.45–7.32) for laboratory-confirmed and clinical ARs respectively
(Figure 2) (p value ,0.0001 for each analysis).
The overall relative risks for SARs of children versus adults in
household studies were 3.79 (95% CI 3.07–4.67) and 1.81 (95%
CI 1.51–2.17) for laboratory-confirmed and clinical SARs
respectively (Figure 3) (p value ,0.0001 for each analysis).
For the subset of household studies in which all contacts were
laboratory tested for the presence of the 2009 pandemic H1N1
influenza A (not just the symptomatic individuals) [7,11,17,37,39],
the overall relative risk for SARs of children vs. adults was 2.84
(95% CI 2.25–3.57) with a p value ,0.0001 (these studies are
marked with an asterisk in Figure 3).
Differences between Virologically Confirmed and Clinical
ARs and SARs
Eight school outbreaks and five household studies provided data
for both virologically confirmed and clinical ARs and SARs
respectively (Tables 2, 3, 4) [6,16,17,20,25,30,32,40,43,44,44,48].
Altogether, these studies provided data for 25 sets of AR and SAR
calculations based on both virologically-confirmed and clinical
cases (for students, school staff, children, adults, day and boarding
schools) (Tables 2, 3, 4). Clinical ARs were higher than
virologically confirmed ARs for all school outbreak sets of analysis,
for both students and staff.
All 11 sets of household SAR analyses included clinical SAR
calculation based on ILI, and ten of them included also clinical
SAR calculation based on ARI. For all the latter ten sets, clinical
ARI SARs were higher than clinical ILI SAR and virologically
confirmed SARs [17,30,44,48]. Clinical ILI SARs were higher
than virologically confirmed SARs in eight sets [6,44,48], equal in
one set [44] and in four sets Clinical ILI SAR was lower than
virologically confirmed SAR [17,30]. The latter four sets belonged
to one study in which all subjects were tested for the presence of
the 2009 H1N1 influenza A virus [17].
Asymptomatic Infection
The infectious potential of asymptomatic infected individuals is
unclear. One study performed in a secondary boarding school in
Guangzhou, China, reported asymptomatic infection in 9.9% of
the students based on seroepidemiological analysis [22]. Another
study from a school in India suggested that asymptomatic carriers
are present in up to 23.6% of the school population [32]. An
outbreak investigation in adolescents provided some insight on the
subject. The outbreak occurred during a party that started at 6
p.m. and continued throughout the night until the morning. The
index patient became symptomatic after 2 a.m. All contacts that
became positive for the pandemic H1N1 influenza A by PCR,
stayed overnight (as did the index case). On the other hand, none
of the individuals who left the party before the index case became
symptomatic, were found to have acquired the virus [29]. Another
study, from Beijing China, found no infection among close
contacts that were exposed to individuals who had sub-clinical
infection with the pandemic 2009 H1N1 influenza A [21].
Discussion
The higher rates of the 2009 pandemic H1N1 influenza A
diagnosis in children and young adults as compared with
individuals over 60 years of age [60] was largely attributed to
prior exposure of the latter group to antigenically similar influenza
viruses [2]. The high rates of pandemic influenza in children led to
school closures around the world in an effort to mitigate the spread
of the virus [60]. These actions represented recognition, on the
part of health authorities, of the importance of children in
spreading the pandemic influenza virus. Although recommenda-
tions for school closure were later modified, the need to
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comprehend the impact of influenza in children, as compared with
adolescents and adults, remains of utmost importance for future
control of epidemics and pandemics, in part given the potential
social and economic disruption school closure entails. School
closures alone also fail to address the entirety of social contexts in
which children and adolescents interact. Advances in diagnostic
and epidemiological tools allowed for an improved analysis of the
Figure 2. Relative risk of attack rates of the 2009 pandemic H1N1 influenza A in children and adults during school outbreaks.
Graphic representation of laboratory confirmed attack rates relative risk (95% CI) in children versus adults in school outbreaks. (Top panel)
Laboratory-confirmed attack rates. (Bottom panel) Clinical attack rates.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0050228.g002
Pandemic H1N1 Influenza A in Children and Contacts
PLOS ONE | www.plosone.org 13 November 2012 | Volume 7 | Issue 11 | e50228
recent pandemic as compared with previous pandemics or
previous seasonal influenza epidemics.
Our systematic review and meta-analysis demonstrates that
children had higher attack rates of the 2009 pandemic H1N1
influenza A than adults, in various settings including schools,
Figure 3. Relative risk of secondary attack rates of the 2009 pandemic H1N1 influenza A in children and adults for household
outbreak investigations. Graphic representation of secondary attack rates relative risk (95% CI) in children versus adults. (Top panel) Laboratory-
confirmed secondary attack rates for laboratory confirmed contacts of laboratory confirmed index cases. (Bottom panel) Secondary attack rates for
clinically diagnosed contacts (with ILI) of laboratory confirmed index cases. In studies marked with an asterisk (*), all contacts were laboratory tested
for the presence of the 2009 pandemic H1N1 influenza A virus.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0050228.g003
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households, travel and social events. Such differences were
reported for both clinical and virologically confirmed cases. The
reasons for such differences were not fully identified, but could
include lack of immunity from previous exposure to similar
influenza viruses as well as virological, host characteristics,
behavioral, environmental and other factors.
Differences in attack rates between children and adults that
were present in the same settings suggest that transmission of the
virus differs within and among the various age groups. In this
regard, household studies demonstrated that transmission among
children was more effective than transmission among adults
[14,39,48,53] or from children to adults.
School outbreaks demonstrated that the physical setting of
students within schools is an important factor with regard to ARs.
Class, grade, and/or buildings separation within schools contrib-
utes to case clustering. A recently published transmission model
supports our findings about the role school structure separation
into grades and classes play in transmission [61].
The apparent lack of (or reduced) transmission during school
lunchtime or assembly suggests that duration of contact, type of
contact and nature of activity contribute to differences in
transmission in various school settings. Contact of short duration
among children may not suffice for effective viral transmission.
This phenomenon may be further supported by the observation
that school bus rides, for a period of 60 minutes or less, did not
result in influenza virus transmission between children [42]. In
contrast, prolonged or repeated contact, such as that occurring
among students of the same classroom or during social events [42],
may result in substantial transmission and higher attack rates.
Active and/or face-to-face interaction between children during
school hours or social activities is probably conducive for effective
transmission, while reduced opportunity for active and/or face-to-
face interaction, such as that occurring during short school
transportation time or formal school gatherings probably dimin-
ishes the opportunity for transmission. The higher ARs reported in
mothers as compared to fathers or other relatives living in the
same household [9], further support the importance of close active
contact in transmission. Such contact is more likely to occur
among children, and between children and their main caretakers
and less likely to be found in the work place. A systematic study of
social contacts among individuals demonstrated that approxi-
mately 50% of school contacts were physical in nature [62]. The
study also showed that contact of a prolonged duration or on a
daily basis involved physical contact [62]. Thus, both the physical
nature and the duration of the contact among children in schools
may contribute significantly to viral transmission. Contact between
children and teachers in primary and secondary schools is likely to
be less physical, of shorter duration, which may partially explain
the low attack rates among school staff members. On the other
hand, the similar attack rates of children and counselors in a
summer camp in South Eastern France reflected their close
contact in that setting [27].
The higher child-to-adult influenza relative risk in school as
compared to household settings, found through our meta analysis
of both clinical and laboratory confirmed cases (Figures 2 and 3),
may reflect the nature of contact between children and adults, the
length of time in which the spread of the virus is evaluated and the
number of potential contacts in each setting. School outbreaks can
last several weeks, involve higher numbers of potential contacts
and a more distant contact between children and adults. On the
other hand, household contact evaluations are usually limited to
shorter time periods, with smaller number of contacts for each
source case and a more intimate interaction between children and
adults. It is also possible that the difference stem from the fact that
school outbreaks do not represent as many age groups as
household studies.
Information about asymptomatic infection is important in order
to determine the full transmission potential of influenza strains in
general, and pandemic strains in particular. The two studies
demonstrating asymptomatic infection rates of 9.9% and 23.6%
respectively [22,32], suggest that asymptomatic children and
adolescents can constitute a significant proportion of the infected
population. However, two other studies demonstrated little or no
transmission from individuals with sub-clinical infection to their
contacts [21,29].
The higher ARs, observed in children during the 2009 H1N1
influenza A pandemic, indicate that children constitute an
important potential reservoir of infection. These findings have
important implications for implementation of mitigation strategies
in general, and vaccination strategies in particular. Until recently,
recommendations for influenza vaccination were directed towards
the elderly, individuals with chronic medical conditions, immu-
nocompromised hosts, healthcare workers and household contacts
of high-risk individuals [63]. Following the recent 2009 H1N1
influenza A virus pandemic, the Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention (CDC) Advisory Committee on Immunization Prac-
tices (ACIP), recommended universal influenza vaccination for all
individuals 6 months of age and older [64]. Although multiple
considerations were taken into account, apart from age and risk,
when vaccine recommendations were made by the committee
(such as burden of disease, anticipated vaccine supply and
vaccination strategies) [65], inclusion of healthy children is
supported by our analysis. Specifically, the demonstration of
higher attack rates among children as compared with adults, and
the transmission of the virus to caregivers (who may potentially
include highly susceptible individuals with pre-existing conditions
or pregnant women). In this regard it is important to note that
influenza vaccination of school children in Japan, between 1962
and 1987, prevented 37,000 to 49,000 deaths per year, providing
protection to older individuals [66].
Given variable vaccine availability at the onset of an epidemic
or pandemic, alternative mitigation strategies are necessary to slow
and/or prevent transmission. The effectiveness of school closure
was debated [67] during the 2009 H1N1 influenza A pandemic.
Our analysis demonstrates that several considerations may be
important when assessing the need to close schools. First, the
physical structure of individual schools may provide sufficient
separation among students of different classes or grades, which can
limit or slow a school-wide outbreak. A real-time school registry of
absent and ill students during influenza pandemic, may reveal ‘hot
spots’ within a given school and guide decisions regarding partial
or full school closure. In schools where students change classrooms
many times a day, physical separation of classes and grades is
unlikely, and thus closure of the entire school may be necessary
during an outbreak. The type and nature of students’ extra-
curricular activities and social gatherings should be addressed as
well.
Our study has several limitations. The studies and reports
selected for this systematic review were based on field investiga-
tions. Variability of the studies was noted with respect to study
design, the number of individual assessed, clinical definitions, the
extent to which confirmatory laboratory tests were used, the
methods of clinical data collection, the duration of time allowed to
determine the number of cases and the differences in division into
age groups used by various studies. Thus the nature of these
studies carried the potential for bias (recall, diagnosis, reporting,
etc.) and variability in the results. A recent study showed that
differences in case ascertainment, extent of laboratory testing and
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duration of follow up, contributed to variability in secondary
infection rates calculated for various household studies [68]. We
tried to overcome these obstacles by collecting data and calculating
ARs and SARs based on both clinical symptoms as well as
confirmatory testing. In addition, those studies where the concern
for bias was very high (such as studies that did not provide
sufficient evidence for 2009 H1N1 pandemic influenza A
diagnosis) were excluded from our study.
Another limitation of this study was the difficulty to assess the
role of anti-viral medication usage on ARs and SARs. Multiple
studies reported the use of anti-virals either as treatment or
prophylaxis, however, they differed in terms of the extent and
modality of their usage and compliance. Only few studies reported
the effect of their use on transmission, with some reporting
reduced transmission [9,10,14,28,31,33,44,48,53] and others
reporting no effect [11,13]. None of the investigations studied
the effect of anti-virals on the risk of transmission between children
and their contacts. However, in most of these studies (which
consisted of household investigations) the ARs and SARs in
younger individuals remained higher than those of adults
[9,14,28,31,33,44].
The fact that, despite the variability of the studies reviewed, ARs
and SARs were consistently higher in children, as compared with
adults, supports the strength of our findings.
To conclude, we performed a quantitative analysis of ARs and
SARs in the pediatric population in comparison to adults in order
to understand the magnitude of the role of children in the
propagation of the 2009 pandemic H1N1 influenza A virus and
their disease burden. Our findings are important for establishing
effective planning efforts and mitigation strategies, particularly
vaccination policies, in the context of pandemic influenza. They
are also important for a more precise simulation modeling and
impact assessment.
Further research using agreed upon unified criteria and
methodologies for outbreak investigations [68], can greatly assist
in studying influenza transmission among children and their
contacts, elucidating the magnitude of asymptomatic influenza
and its role in transmission and evaluating the effect of mitigation
strategies on pandemic influenza transmission among children and
their contacts.
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